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Abstract:  
Preventive health care is promoted by many organisations from the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) to regional and national governments. The degree of cost-sharing between individuals 
and the health care service affects preventive service use. For instance, out-of-pocket fees that are 
paid by individuals for curative services reduce preventive care demand. We examine the impact 
of subsidised preventive care on demand. We motivate our analysis with a theoretical model of 
inter-temporal substitution in which individuals decide whether to have a health examination in 
period one and consequently whether to be treated if required in period two. We derive four 
testable hypotheses. We test these using the subsidised eye care policy introduced in Scotland in 
2006. This provides a natural experiment that allows us to identify the effect of the policy on the 
demand for eye examinations. We also explore socio-economic differences in the response to the 
policy. The analysis is based on a sample from the British Household Panel Survey of 52,613 
observations of people, aged between 16 and 59 years, living in England and Scotland for the 
period 2001-2008. Using the difference-in-difference methodology, we find that on average the 
policy did not affect demand for eye examinations. We find that demand for eye examinations 
only increased among high income households, and consequently, inequalities in eye-care services 
demand have widened in Scotland since the introduction of the policy.  
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1 Introduction 
Preventive health care is promoted by many organisations from the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) to regional and national governments. Preventive care can detect illnesses 
earlier, making them easier to treat or reducing mortality. The Grossman model (1972) provides a 
theory of the demand for health, but the model does not include uncertainty and this makes it 
difficult to distinguish between the demand for preventive and curative care (Kenkel, 1994). 
Okeke et al., (2013) propose a theory of demand for preventive care and (possible) subsequent 
treatment and apply this to study screening demand in Nigeria.  
Many preventive care services require individuals to pay an out of pocket user fee. User fees 
are a positive price charged by providers to users at the point of delivery. Economically, the 
rationale for user fees is to improve allocative efficiency and act as a revenue collection 
mechanism (Stabile and Thomson, 2014). Existing empirical evidence indicates that the degree of 
cost-sharing influences the use of preventive services; in particular, that out-of-pocket fees borne 
by individuals reduce the demand for preventive care (e.g. cancer screening, vaccinations, etc.) by 
increasing the price paid by the individual at the time of consumption. The overwhelming 
majority of studies conducted in developed countries conclude that cost-sharing reduces demand 
for preventive services (Christensen, 1995; Friedman et al., 2002; Kiefe et al., 1994; Krůtilová, 
2010; Lundberg et al.,1998; Nexøe et al., 1997; Solanki et al., 2000; Stoner et al.,1998).  Similarly, 
for studies conducted in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), the evidence suggests that 
the introduction or increase in user fees has almost and everywhere led to a decrease in utilisation 
(Schokkaert and Van de Voorde, 2011; Cohn and Dupas, 2010; Borghi et al., 2006; Souteyrand et 
al., 2008) 
Economic theory further predicts that cost-sharing generates adverse distributional 
consequences as low income individuals reduce utilisation more than the remaining population. 
Most empirical studies find that user fees lead to a stronger reduction in utilisation among the 
poor (James et al., 2006) in both developed countries (Thomson et al., 2003) and LMICs (Sepehri 
and Chernomas, 2001). Thus, user fees threaten equality of access as poorer individuals may not 
always seek appropriate care or postpone necessary health care consumption.   
Most studies focus on the cost of preventive care and its effect on demand, and ignore costs 
that arise from treatment required after screening. Okeke et al., (2013) provide a novel 
contribution by examining the impact of subsidising treatment costs on the demand for cancer 
screening in Nigeria. We further add to the literature by investigating how the removal of an out-
of-pocket fee for eye tests influences the demand for testing when follow-up treatment costs are 
not covered and are borne by individuals.  
This study contributes to the literature on demand for preventive care by exploring the effect 
on demand of subsidising preventive care to make it free at the point of delivery. We study the 
impact of subsidising preventive care in the context of demand for eye care services in Scotland. 
In 2006, the Scottish Government introduced a subsidised eye examination policy that provided 
examinations at private optometrists at no out of pocket cost to all individuals who are resident 
in Scotland. Previously, Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom (UK) had the same eye care 
service, in which individuals paid for eye tests out of pocket at a private optometrist. In this 
paper, we examine the effect of the policy change in Scotland using difference in difference 
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methods in which Scotland is the treated group and England is used as the control group. Our 
analysis provides empirical evidence about the determinants of preventive care demand.  
The paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we examine the issue of 
subsidising preventive care within a natural experiment framework. The subsidisation of eye 
examinations in Scotland is a transparent exogenous source of variation in the cost of preventive 
care that enables us to identify the control and treatment groups and explore the policy effect on 
the demand for eye examinations, using suitable econometric techniques on a large population-
representative sample. The majority of studies in the preventive care literature either offer 
qualitative evidence or employ simple statistical analysis using small-size data sets (as discussed in 
Okeke et al., 2013). We find that on average the policy had no effect on the demand for eye 
examinations. Second, we explore how people of different socioeconomic status responded to 
the policy. We find that only higher income individuals increased their demand for eye 
examinations. This analysis provides useful information for policy makers and highlights how the 
policy has affected inequality in health care use. Third, we contribute to the wider debate about 
the benefits of universal subsidised health care when public spending is reduced. The remainder 
of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we present a theoretical model and derive 
testable hypotheses for our empirical analysis, in section 3 we discuss the natural experiment 
based on the eye examinations subsidy policy in Scotland and the data used in the empirical 
analysis, in section 4 we present our empirical analysis and in section 5 we conclude.  
2 Theoretical framework 
We model individuals’ decisions to have a health examination using an inter-temporal choice 
framework (Okeke et al., 2013). The demand for health examinations is driven by individuals’ 
demand to acquire information about their health status that may be useful for the detection and 
treatment of health conditions. The demand for health testing differs from the demand for health 
care. At the time of the decision to undergo an examination, the individual has an expectation 
about his/her health state, but does not have full information. Therefore, the individual is 
uncertain about the future benefit of the information they will receive from the examination.  
We assume a two period model in which individuals derive utility from health and 
consumption. There are two health states “good health” and “bad health” with probability of 
each state being 1 − 𝑝 and 𝑝, respectively. In period one, the individual decides whether to have 
an examination or not. Depending on the outcome of the examination, the individual will 
undergo a treatment or not in period two. Without loss of generality, we can also assume that in 
period 1 all individuals have good health. The decision to have an examination involves some 
cost (𝑐) that reflects both the financial cost and opportunity cost of time. The latter is important, 
because even if an examination is fully-subsidised individuals would still have to consider the 
time price of attending and “consuming” health care. Traditionally the opportunity cost of time is 
measured either as forgone labour income, if time is taken from paid employment, or cost of 
leisure time, if time is taken from non-labour time (Cauley, 1987; Janssen, 1992; Torgerson et al., 
1994). A priori, it is not clear whether it is the people at the top of the income distribution or 
those at the lower part of the income distribution who are expected to have a higher opportunity 
cost of time. In relation to forgone earnings, individuals who are salaried workers should not face 
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a wage reduction when attending for health care. However, hourly-paid workers and piece 
workers would lose labour-income. Therefore, one could hypothesise that the lower socio-
economic groups potentially face a higher opportunity cost since they are more likely to be hourly 
paid or piece workers. One could come to the opposite conclusion when considering leisure time. 
The price of leisure time is the wage rate that people forgo by not offering to work. Hence, the 
opportunity cost of time should be higher for those high in the income distribution, since their 
leisure time costs more. In the paper, for the purpose of our analysis we acknowledge that there 
is an opportunity cost of time associated with attending health care, but do not make any further 
assumptions regarding its relative size between high and low socio-economic groups. When the 
examination predicts the bad health state in period two, the individual undergoes a treatment that 
also incurs some cost (𝑠). Treatment is assumed to restore individuals’ health to the good state. 
To derive testable hypotheses, we assume that individuals have a utility function characterised 
by constant relative risk aversion and a risk aversion parameter equal to 1, so we assume a 
logarithmic functional form for the utility function. Following the tradition of state-dependent 
utility (Zeckhauser, 1970 and 1973; Arrow, 1974; and Viscusi and Evans, 1990), we introduce a 
multiplicative parameter for the individual’s health status (𝑢 for good health state and 𝑣 for bad 
health state). The logarithmic utility function is expressed as 𝑢[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)] for good health state and 
𝑣[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)] for bad health state, where 𝑌 represents level of income. If we further assume that 
utility and the marginal utility of consumption are greater when the person is in a good health 
state, an assumption widely considered in the literature (Viscusi and Evans, 1990), then 𝑢 > 𝑣. 
Our framework can then be described as follows: 
Person has health examination in period 1  
In period 1:    𝑈 = 𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐)     (1) 
In period 2:  𝑈 = 𝑝(𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠), 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)]) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) (2) 
Person does not have health examination in period 1  
In period 1:     𝑈 = 𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)      (3) 
In period 2:    𝑈 = 𝑝𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)   (4) 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the two decisions to (i) undertake a health 
examination and (ii) receive treatment in a sequential two-period framework. We assume that the 
cost of treatment and the associated loss of consumption is smaller than the utility loss due to 
having bad health 𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) >  𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌). This implies that all individuals whose examination 
predicts bad health will have treatment in period 2. We assume that the cost of examination and 
the cost of treatment are both smaller than individual’s income, 𝑌 − 𝑠 > 0 and 𝑌 − 𝑐 > 0.  
The individual will be indifferent between having an examination or not at some critical level 
of 𝑝∗ where: 
   𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐) + 𝑝∗𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) + (1 − 𝑝∗)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) = 
  𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) + 𝑝∗𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) + (1 − 𝑝∗)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) (5) 
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which implies 
 𝑝∗ =
𝑢[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑐)]
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑠)−𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
   (6) 
𝑝∗ may be interpreted as the individual’s threshold level of bad health - the level of bad health at 
which the individual is indifferent between having an examination and not having one - and thus 
defines a utility maximizing decision rule. Individuals will take a health examination only when 
𝑝 ≥ 𝑝∗.   
The model allows us to derive some interesting predictions regarding the level of the 
threshold, 𝑝∗. First, we can easily see that the cost of examination (𝑐) is positively associated with 
𝑝∗, since 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑐
> 0. This implies that as the cost of the examination reduces, the threshold level 
reduces as well, so more people choose to have an examination. Second, as the cost of treatment 
(𝑠) increases, the threshold level increases and fewer people are willing to undertake an 
examination, , since 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑠
> 0.  Third, the model allows us to hypothesise how socio-economic 
differences amongst individuals will affect the uptake of the examination. In particular, the model 
suggests that individuals with higher incomes will have a lower 𝑝∗ threshold. It becomes clear 
then that a priori we should expect higher levels of examinations from the higher socio-economic 
groups, since 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑌
< 0. All mathematical derivations are provided in the Appendix. 
We use this model to examine the demand for eye examinations. Prior to testing their eyes 
individuals have an expectation about the state of their eye health that is analogous to the 
probability of bad health (𝑝). The threshold level of having an eye examination 𝑝∗ depends on 
the cost of the examination (𝑐)  and the cost of treatment (𝑠), which can be thought of as the 
relative cost of spectacles or other eye-care related products that the individual may purchase. 
The predictions of the model can be summarised as follows:  
• Hypothesis 1: A reduction in the cost of the examination will lead to an overall higher 
demand for testing;  
• Hypothesis 2: People who overall perceive themselves to have better (eye) health, lower (𝑝), 
will be less likely to take an examination;  
• Hypothesis 3: People from higher socio-economic groups will have a higher uptake of 
examinations. 
3 A natural experiment on the demand for eye examinations 
Eye care services in Scotland changed on the 1st April 2006. The Scottish Government 
introduced free biennial NHS eye examinations.  The policy aimed to increase demand for eye 
examinations and in doing so to improve the visual health of its population through the early 
detection of eye health problems (Scottish Executive, 2005). Until 2006 all UK countries had the 
same eye care policy, namely, that most people who wanted or needed an eye test would pay for 
this out of pocket at a private optometrist. A number of groups were exempt from paying for an 
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eye test. These were: under 16 or over 60 years old; full-time students aged 16-18; those claiming 
income support or income-based job seekers allowance; those entitled to an NHS Tax Credit 
Exemption Certificate, pension credit guarantee credit; those registered as blind or partially 
sighted; diagnosed with glaucoma; at risk of glaucoma; diagnosed with diabetes; and those with 
an HC2 or HC3 Certificate. Data available from the Information Services Division (ISD) of NHS 
Scotland shows that on average 9% of the Scottish population are exempt for paying for eye care 
services (based on voucher type 3, which included the provision of glasses and contact lenses). 
This proportion has remained stable (at 9%) from 2006/07 to 2013/14. After 2006, in Scotland, 
some groups are entitled to more frequent free eye examinations based on their experience or 
risk of eye related conditions. Patients under 16 years, or aged 60 years or over; individuals with 
glaucoma, or those aged 40 years or over with a close family history of glaucoma; and patients 
with ocular hypertension or with diabetes are entitled to a free eye examination every year. For all 
other patients, aged between 16 years and 59 years, the prescribed frequency of an eye 
examination is every two years. 
These policy changes in Scotland provide a natural experiment. The policy introduced an 
exogenous variation in the cost of eye examinations that affected only Scotland. Thus we can 
identify a treatment group (Scotland) and a control group (England) that enables us to empirically 
assess the treatment/policy impact on the demand for eye examinations and explore socio-
economic differences in how people responded to the policy. 
3.1 Data 
We use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) dataset to assess the impact that the free 
eye examination policy had on the Scottish population. The BHPS is a nationally representative 
annual survey of adults, covering over 5,000 households in the UK from 1991-2008 (Taylor et al., 
2010). Ethics approval is not required for this paper because the BHPS is an anonymised data set 
available in the public domain. Our sample consists of people aged between 16 and 59 years 
living in England and Scotland for the period of time 2001-2008. The advantages of this survey 
are that: (i) it is a UK representative sample; (ii) it is conducted at an individual-level; (iii) it 
contains rich information on the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the 
respondents; and (iv) it has been running for a sufficiently long period of time to allow us to 
observe individuals’ choices before and after the policy.  
Our analysis, based on the BHPS, focuses on people’s responses to a specific question in the 
BHPS on whether they had an eye test since September 1st in the previous year. In order to 
identify the free eye care policy period in Scotland we look at the survey interviews conducted 
since 2007 as they refer to eye examinations that took place from September 2006 onwards, after 
the policy was introduced (April 2006). For the interviews that took place between April and 
December in the year 2006, we cannot identify whether individuals in Scotland had a fee-free eye 
examination or not since the eye-testing period covered (between September 2005 and the time 
of the interview) includes both a pre and post policy period. Therefore, we exclude the 
observations that fall in this period of time. As a result, the sample considered in 2006 is 
significantly smaller than the other years, with only 210 observations from England and 176 
observations from Scotland included.  
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Attrition rates between BHPS waves are relatively low. Taylor (1994) reported specifically on 
attrition in the early waves of the BHPS, suggesting it to be empirically less of a concern that in 
some other longitudinal designs. The dataset used in the analysis is unweighted. As discussed in 
Dickens (1990) and Solon et al., (2015), there is no automatic gain in efficiency from using 
weights. Furthermore, Lambert (2006) argues that multivariate analyses of relative effects are 
robust to smaller sampling imperfections, hence it would not be unreasonable to use unweighted 
samples of the BHPS. 
The BHPS also collects a wide range of demographic and socio-economic characteristics of 
the respondents. Table 1 provides the definitions of the variables used in the analysis and Table 2 
presents some descriptive statistics on the whole sample and by eye examination status. Out of 
the original 56,239 sample observations, information on eye tests was missing in 3,626 cases 
leaving a sample of 52,613 observations. For the individuals whose information on eye tests was 
missing in at least one wave of the BHPS, average eye examination uptake is 0.351, whereas the 
uptake is marginally higher (0.364) for those who had no missing information. However, the 
difference in means is not statistically significant at the 5% level, which provides some assurance 
regarding potential selection issues. Overall, around one third of the sample had an eye 
examination. As expected, a larger proportion of women have their eyes examined compared to 
men: this is consistent with the frequently reported result that health services demand is higher 
amongst women than amongst men (Vaidya et al., 2012; Redondo-Sendino et al., 2006; Bertakis et 
al., 2000). A higher proportion of individuals aged between 40 and 59 years have had an eye 
examination, whereas eye care demand is lower amongst the younger age groups. This is in line 
with the argument that health risk increases with age and so should health care consumption (e.g. 
Kenkel, 1994). A lower proportion of individuals reporting good health have eye examinations 
and a higher proportion of higher educated individuals have eye examinations. These findings are 
consistent with the predictions of the Grossman model and also consistent with results from 
other empirical research (Carrieri and Bilger, 2013; Kenkel, 1994).  
4 Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Demand for eye-care in Scotland 
To assess how individuals responded to the free eye examination policy we use the difference-
in-difference (DD) estimation method to examine the policy’s impact while isolating the effects 
of confounding factors at the time of the policy’s introduction. The DD method has been used 
to test the impact of policy and/or health system interventions on health care demand in other 
settings (Layte et al., 2009; Chatterji and Meara, 2010; Basinga et al., 2011; Ikenwilo, 2013). We 
consider two groups of individuals; those affected by the policy (Scotland - treatment group), and 
those unaffected by the policy (England - control group). The selection of the control group is 
important because use of the DD method assumes that the outcome (eye examinations) in the 
treatment and control groups would have followed a common trend in the absence of the policy 
(free eye examinations), and therefore it is the policy that causes deviation from this common 
trend. This assumption is difficult to test. Figure 2 plots the average proportion of the population 
having an eye examination for England and Scotland before and after the policy to provide an 
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informal graphic test of the common trend assumption and offer some support that the 
underlying trends were similar in the pre-policy period. The spike in the eye examination uptake 
recorded in 2006 is probably driven by the small sample size used in that particular year, so the 
2006 figures should be interpreted with caution. Although, this may cast doubt on the validity of 
the numbers presented for the year 2006, the purpose of Figure 2 is to provide a visual 
confirmation of the common trend assumption between England and Scotland for the year prior 
to the policy. 
Placebo (falsification) tests presented in Section 5.3 lend further support to the common trend 
assumption and the selection of England as the control group. Wales and Northern Ireland were 
also considered as control groups, but there was not a common trend in eye examinations. 
We are interested in eye-care demand for group i, where i = 0 for the control group and i = 1 
for the treatment group, at time t, where t = 0 before the policy and t = 1 after the policy change. 
The DD estimator is the difference in the means of the demand rate between the treatment and 
control groups between both time periods: 
    ∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    (7) 
in which 
    ∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0    (8) 
In the regression analysis framework, the dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 indicates that individual i has 
an eye test, and 𝐹𝑖 defines the individuals in the treatment group. Equation (7) assumes 
differences in demand rates between treatment and control groups are attributable to the policy 
and is identified only by using the same individuals in both groups. When the data do not contain 
the same individuals in both groups, a multiple variable regression containing at least three 
regressors (those affected by the policy, the time period following the policy and the impact of 
the policy) is estimated:  
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (9) 
Equation (9) captures possible differences between those individuals who are affected by the 
policy and those who are not.  𝐴𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating the time period after the 
introduction of the policy;   𝛽1 is a measure of the difference in eye tests between the treatment 
and control groups prior to the policy;  𝛽2 is a measure of aggregate factors that cause changes in 
eye tests irrespective of the policy;   𝛽3 is a measure of the effect of the free eye-care policy on 
demand in Scotland, holding all other confounding factors constant; 𝜀𝑖  is the error term, while 
𝛽0  is the usual intercept.  
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the respondent had 
an eye examination since September last year and zero otherwise. We begin with a parsimonious 
specification (1), as described in equation (9), which includes only a control for people living in 
Scotland (treatment group), a dummy variable indicating the policy period (defined by the 
interviews that took place from 2007 onwards), and their interaction term. As explained above, 
the main estimated parameter of interest is the coefficient of the interaction term that provides a 
measurement of the effect of free eye examinations on eye-care demand levels in Scotland. For 
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robustness purposes, we also consider a set of additional covariates. The full specification model 
includes a control variable for those individuals who may be entitled to a free eye examination 
based on their socio-economic or health characteristics. This is a group of individuals who would 
normally receive free eye examinations in both England and Scotland in all years covered in the 
sample (before and after the policy). Furthermore, individuals who have their eyes tested may be 
more likely to have regular eye examinations. For the majority of individuals, the NHS 
recommends that they have eye examinations every two years, while for the more vulnerable 
groups (e.g. over 60 years, those diagnosed with diabetes or glaucoma, etc.) the recommendation 
is every year. Therefore, in order to control for state dependency we also include lagged values of 
the dependent variable for the periods t-1 and t-2. This unavoidably leads to a reduction in the 
sample size, since for many individuals the number of years that can be used in the analysis 
reduces. The presence of children in the household may affect the lifestyle and health related 
choices people make. This is the reason why the number of children, along with other controls 
for household and individual characteristics such as gender, age, marital status, and education, are 
included in the specification. Finally, two dummy variables for individuals whose equivalised 
household income is either in the top or bottom 25% of the income distribution and year trends 
are also considered.  
The eye-examination equations are estimated using a linear probability estimator with robust 
standard errors, clustered by individuals, and presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficient of 
the interaction term (Scotland × Policy), in both specifications explored, has a positive sign but it is 
statistically insignificant. This does not provide supporting evidence for Hypothesis 1: that a 
reduction in the cost of the examination will lead to an overall higher demand for testing. We 
find that the policy did not have a statistically significant effect on demand for eye examinations 
in Scotland.  
The results from the full specification model that includes demographic and socioeconomic 
differences provide support for both Hypothesis 2: that people who overall perceive themselves to 
have better (eye) health, lower (𝑝), will be less likely to take an examination; and Hypothesis 3: that 
people from higher socio-economic groups will have a higher uptake of examinations. Individuals 
who reported good overall health and people who had no visits to their GP in the past 12 
months are less likely to have an eye examination (1.3% and 3.6% less likely, respectively). 
Individuals who perceive themselves to be in a good health state are less likely to have an eye 
examination because their probability of bad health (𝑝) is below their threshold level 𝑝∗.  The 
effect related to GP visits may also be driven by the fact that people who visit their GP may be 
referred for an eye examination, thus may be more likely to have an eye examination than those 
who did not visit their GP. Individuals from wealthier households (top 25% of the income 
distribution) are found to be 1.4% more likely to have an eye examination, compared to those in 
the middle of the income distribution (25-75%), whereas the opposite is true for those located in 
the bottom 25% of the distribution. Education increases the demand for eye examinations.  
We also find that demand for eye examinations is higher among older people, women, people 
who are married, living together or those separated than younger people, men or single people, 
respectively.  
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4.2 Socio-economic differences in policy impact 
The results in Table 3 indicate that on average the policy did not increase demand for eye 
examinations in Scotland. The results also show that there are important socio-economic 
differences in the demand for eye examinations. Therefore, we test if the policy had a 
heterogeneous impact across the different socio-economic groups in the Scottish population. In 
particular, from a progressive social policy perspective it is important to test if the policy 
increased demand in those socio-economic groups with relatively lower incidences of eye 
examinations.  
Our theoretical model predicts that reducing the examination cost should increase demand 
more as individuals’ income increases. This occurs because both the cost of the examination 
(𝑐) and the cost of the treatment (𝑠) are included in an individual’s decision making. If we only 
consider the cost of the examination(𝑐), then a reduction in 𝑐 should increase demand more at 
lower income levels, because c  is a greater proportion of their overall income (𝑌). However, the 
inter-temporal nature of individuals’ decisions means that outcomes and costs in period 2 are 
factored into individuals’ choices in period 1. Therefore for low values of 𝑌 the benefits of the 
treatment may not out-weigh the associated expenses and consumption loss, hence there may be 
some individuals who will not have the treatment.  
We therefore hypothesise that a reduction in the cost of the examination (𝑐) should trigger a 
stronger response from individuals who are higher in the socio-economic ladder, since the 
potential cost of treatment in period 2 may deter individuals with lower incomes from 
undertaking the examination in period 1: 
• Hypothesis 4: A reduction in the cost of the examination will trigger a stronger response 
from the higher socio-economic groups.  
This is in line with the argument made by Okele et al., (2013); “if treatment exists but access is 
limited or constrained e.g. because it is very expensive, the incentive to get tested is diminished” 
(Okeke et al., 2013, p.208).  
In order to test if there are differences in the effect of the policy across socioeconomic groups 
we use a difference-in-difference-in-difference model (DDD) that considers three dimensions, 
time (𝐴), region (𝐹) and income (𝐼). The advantage of the DDD model is that it allows for 
heterogeneous treatment effects across different income groups. The DDD model includes a full 
set of dummies, as well as all pairwise interactions:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝐴𝑖 ∙ 𝐼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (10) 
The coefficient of interest is that of the triple interaction term (𝛽7). We consider two income 
groups, individuals whose equivalised household income is in the top and bottom 25% of the 
income distribution. Figure 3 plots the average uptake of eye examinations, separately for these 
two income groups for England and Scotland. The common trend assumption appears to be 
supported in both cases, although it is more evident for those located at the top of the income 
distribution. 
Equation (10) is estimated based on both a parsimonious and a full specification, similar to 
Section 4.1, and the estimated coefficients of the triple interaction terms are presented in Table 4. 
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The estimates reveal a heterogeneous policy effect. Individuals from the wealthier households 
(top 25% of equivalised household income distribution) increased their demand for eye 
examinations – the uptake after the policy increased by 4-5%. Individuals in the bottom 25% 
were unaffected by the free eye examination policy. This provides supportive evidence for 
Hypothesis 4. As a result of the heterogeneous policy impact, the gap in eye-care services demand 
between low and high-income individuals further increased, and socio-economic differences in 
eye examinations have increased. To test the robustness of this result, we split the sample into 
three income groups (top 25%, middle 50%, and bottom 25% of the income distribution) and 
estimated the DD model separately for each group. The estimated coefficient for the interaction 
term is only positive and statistically significant for the top income group, which is consistent 
with the results from the DDD model. These results are available from the authors on request. 
4.3 Placebo estimates and sensitivity analysis 
The common trend assumption is a key identifying assumption in the DD estimates. We use 
three falsification tests using placebo experiments to test the robustness of our findings. The 
placebo estimates enhance the credibility of our identification strategy by contrasting the 
estimated treatment effects to those based on alternative “placebo” treatments.  
The first falsification test is based on a fake treatment. Specifically, we simulate a fake policy, 
introduced in September 2004, and consider only the period of time before the actual eye care 
policy was introduced in Scotland. We perform the same DD and DDD analysis, using the full 
specification model and present the estimated interaction coefficients in Table 5. The full 
specification regression estimates can be made available upon request from the authors. Under 
the common trend assumption, the interaction term is not expected to be statistically significantly 
different from zero. The results of the first falsification test show no effect at all.  
The second falsification test is based on a fake treatment group that consists of the inner and 
outer region of London, with the control group being the rest of England. Neither of these 
groups were affected by the policy. The estimated interaction coefficients, presented in Table 6 
and are not statistically significant. 
The third falsification test uses three irrelevant health examinations that we, a priori, expect to 
be unrelated to eye examinations. We use (i) blood test, (ii) cholesterol test, and (iii) chest health 
check-up or x-ray as alternative outcomes. We do not consider dental check-ups as an alternative 
examination because a free dental check up was introduced in Scotland at the same time 
(Ikenwilo, 2013). The eye care policy appears to have no impact on any of the alternative health 
check-ups considered (Table 7). Together the results of these three falsification tests lend support 
to the previously estimated effects.  
In addition to the falsification tests, we also perform two types of sensitivity analysis. First we 
exclude from the sample all the individuals who might be exempt from eye examination payment, 
thus considering only a sample of people who face the full charge (in England for the entire 
period, and in Scotland during the control period) or face no charge (in Scotland in the treatment 
period). The DD and DDD regressions are re-estimated based on the full specification model 
and the estimates are presented in Table 8. The estimated treatment effects remain the same, 
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suggesting that only individuals from the wealthier households responded positively to the policy 
by increasing their eye examination uptake by 4%.  
A potential issue of concern may be that individuals might have anticipated the policy, and 
thus delayed having their eyes tested until the payment of examination fees was removed. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the opposite. To deter this anticipatory reaction that would 
adversely affect business of the high street optician practises, there was no wide publicity of the 
policy prior to its introduction. As a further sensitivity test we exclude from the analysis all the 
individuals who were interviewed during the first three months of 2006 and re-estimate the DD 
and DDD regressions using the full specification model. The estimates, presented in the second 
half of Table 8, remain unchanged and do not suggest any anticipatory adjustment from the 
patients’ side. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We test the impact of subsidised health examinations on health care demand. We use a 
theoretical model of inter-temporal substitution to derive four testable hypotheses. We test these 
using data on eye examinations in the UK, and exploit a policy change in Scotland in 2006 that 
creates exogenous variation in eye examination cost between Scotland and England.  
We find that the eye examination policy in Scotland did not, on average, increase demand for 
eye examinations. However we do find differences across socio-economic groups in the demand 
for eye care services. We find that only individuals from the wealthier households increased their 
eye examination uptake. Given that these individuals were more likely to have their eyes 
examined before the policy introduction we find that the universal free eye examination policy 
has increased inequality in preventive care use. 
One could thus argue that the lack of significant impact on the number of eye examinations 
combined with the undesirable effect of increasing inequalities is enough to suggest that the free 
eye examination policy should be reconsidered. It was recently estimated that General 
Ophthalmic Services costs increased by around £21 million following the introduction of free eye 
examinations in 2006 and, even accounting for historic trends, costs in 2011 were around £32 
million higher than expected (4-Consulting, 2012). This poses the question of whether removing 
the policy would improve fiscal sustainability and contribute to narrowing inequalities. 
It is therefore important to consider if the policy represents value for money. This is 
particularly difficult to assess because any health improvements derived from this policy will not 
be fully felt for many years. The introduction of free NHS eye examinations effectively expanded 
the testing of sight to the provision of a more extensive eye health examination which enabled 
optometrists to detect early signs of sight problems. As of 2010, there were almost 2 million 
people living with sight loss in the UK and, with an increasingly aging population, that number is 
predicted to increase to almost 4 million by 2050 (RNIB Scotland, 2010). Loss of sight is 
expensive, with an estimated £22 billion costs associated with it in the UK (RNIB Scotland, 
2010). Although one can expect significant future cost savings, through the early treatment of 
disease and people avoiding loss of vision, these savings will only emerge over the longer term as 
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a much larger section of Scottish society will potentially have their eyes examined on a regular 
basis. 
Nevertheless, the question of inequality remains. While we find that the policy did not 
increase demand for eye-care, on average, it did increase demand among individuals from 
wealthier households and did not increase demand from lower income households. This provides 
an example of an intervention aimed at the whole of the population that inadvertently increases 
inequality because different segments of the population face different barriers to access. Our 
model predicts that individuals decide to be tested based on the cost of the test and the cost of 
treatment. Therefore lower income individuals are not tested even when the cost of the test 
decreases if the cost of treatment (spectacles or other related products) is too high. In this case, 
policymakers could explore treatment subsidies as well as screening price subsidies. Our results 
may also reflect an example of the “inverse care law” in which populations with the most need 
receive less care (Tudor Hart, 1971). Shickle et al., (2015) report this is the case for eye-care in 
England.  Primary eye care is supplied by the private market and access is dependent on the 
location of opticians on the high-street. Private optometrists’ business earnings depend on 
revenue from screening tests and optical appliances, which gives businesses less incentive to 
locate in areas in which revenue from the sales of optical appliances will be lower (Shickle et al., 
2015).  
Knight and Lindfield (2015) systematically review the relationship between socio-economic 
status (SES) and access to eye care services (both high-street, primary and secondary care) in the 
UK and find mixed evidence. Four studies consider utilisation of high-street eye care services, 
one study that uses BHPS data up to 2003 finds no association (Sabates et al., 2008), however 
three studies find use is positively associated with SES (Majeed et al., 2008; Rahi et al., 2008; Van 
der Pols et al., 1999). In general, more advantaged groups have better access to preventive care 
because they have more resources (not only income, but also time and life skills) to access this 
care (MacIntyre, 2007). Other universal health promotion policies in Scotland have also been 
found to inadvertently increase health inequalities (Schou and Wight, 1994; De Walle et al., 1999). 
Our results are likely to be generalizable to other primary care screening or preventive care 
settings where the outcome screened for is not life limiting, and the cost of treatment is not fully 
covered by the health care service. Indeed, in terms of socio-economic status differences, our 
results are comparable to other studies of preventive care utilisation. We caution about 
generalising our results to screening tests for conditions that have a large impact on mortality or 
morbidity (such as cancer) and those for which treatments are provided by the health care 
service.  
One strength of this study is that we use a large national household panel to investigate how 
user fees affect demand for a preventive care service. In doing so, our evidence comes from a 
broad sample of the population rather than being limited to health care users. Furthermore, we 
are able to assess the impact of the policy on outcomes (screening uptake) in general, and we are 
also able to assess how the policy impacts on different socioeconomic groups. A second strength 
of this study is our use of a robust technique (difference in differences) and a set of falsification 
tests (a fake policy, fake treatment group, and unaffected preventive care services) to demonstrate 
the robustness of our findings.  
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One limitation of  this study is that our estimates refer to the period of time immediately after 
the policy was introduced. We are unable to capture an increase in screening if the policy affected 
this with a delay. For example, if people only became aware of the policy slowly after it was 
implemented. Anecdotal evidence, such as research by a chain of ophthalmic opticians, found 
that by July 2007, 66% of the population were still unaware that eye examinations had been made 
universally free (Frost’s Scottish Anatomy, 2007). This could be particularly true since the free 
eye care policy was announced just a few days after the smoking ban in Scotland, which 
dominated the media attention and the public debate. 
A second limitation is that we are unable to provide a thorough Cost-Benefit Analysis of the 
policy. The test cost has been shifted from individuals to government. We do not know precisely 
what each person was paying before the policy. However, we do not consider the long-term eye 
health outcomes for those who are tested. Future research should consider if the Scottish 
population have better eye health outcomes overtime and provide a full evaluation of the policy 
taking into account the impact on secondary care, for example in ophthalmology clinics, due to 
changes in the number of referrals or workload and case-mix.  
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Tables 
Table 1: Definitions of variables  
Variable name Definition 
Had an eye test 1 if person had an eye test in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
Exempt group 
1 if person fulfils the criteria for a free eye test (when fees exist); 0 
otherwise 
Female 1 if person is a woman; 0 otherwise 
Age: 16-29 (reference) 1 if person is aged between 16 to 29; 0 otherwise 
Age: 30-39 1 if person is aged between 30 to 39; 0 otherwise 
Age: 40-49 1 if person is aged between 40 to 49; 0 otherwise 
Age: 50-59 1 if person is aged between 50 to 59; 0 otherwise 
Number of children Number of children present in the household  
Living together 1 if married, or cohabitating; 0 otherwise 
Separated 1 if separated; 0 otherwise 
Widowed 1 if widowed; 0 otherwise 
Single (reference) 1 if single; 0 otherwise 
Good health 1 if excellent or good health state in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise  
No visits to GP 1 if person had not visited the GP in the past 12 months; 0 otherwise 
HH income: top 25% 
1 if person’s equivalised household income is in the top 25% of 
income distribution; 0 otherwise 
No qualification 1 if person has no formal qualifications; 0 otherwise 
Secondary educ. (reference) 1 if person has up to secondary education; 0 otherwise 
First or higher degree 1 if person has University degree or above; 0 otherwise 
Scotland 1 if person lives in Scotland; 0 otherwise 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
All 
No eye 
examination Had eye examination t-test 
Had an eye test 0.362 (0.481) 
     Exempt group 0.183 (0.387) 0.172 (0.377) 0.203 (0.402) *** 
Female 0.534 (0.499) 0.503 (0.500) 0.589 (0.492) *** 
Age: 16-29 (reference) 0.304 (0.460) 0.328 (0.470) 0.261 (0.439) *** 
Age: 30-39 0.250 (0.433) 0.274 (0.446) 0.206 (0.405) *** 
Age: 40-49 0.243 (0.429) 0.228 (0.420) 0.270 (0.444) *** 
Age: 50-59 0.203 (0.402) 0.169 (0.375) 0.263 (0.440) *** 
Number of children 0.737 (1.011) 0.775 (1.031) 0.700 (0.972) *** 
Living together 0.498 (0.500) 0.478 (0.500) 0.534 (0.499) *** 
Separated 0.114 (0.318) 0.106 (0.308) 0.128 (0.334) *** 
Widowed 0.010 (0.102) 0.009 (0.097) 0.012 (0.109) *** 
Single (reference) 0.377 (0.485) 0.407 (0.491) 0.325 (0.468) *** 
Good health 0.739 (0.439) 0.754 (0.431) 0.713 (0.452) *** 
No visits to GP 0.277 (0.448) 0.306 (0.461) 0.228 (0.420) *** 
HH income: top 25% 0.337 (0.473) 0.320 (0.466) 0.368 (0.482) *** 
HH income: mid 25-75% 0.480 (0.500) 0.489 (0.500) 0.464 (0.499) *** 
HH income: low 25% 0.183 (0.387) 0.192 (0.394) 0.168 (0.374) *** 
No qualification 0.157 (0.364) 0.158 (0.365) 0.155 (0.362)  
Secondary educ. (reference) 0.667 (0.471) 0.677 (0.468) 0.649 (0.477) *** 
First or higher degree 0.176 (0.381) 0.164 (0.371) 0.196 (0.397) *** 
Scotland 0.264 (0.441) 0.268 (0.443) 0.257 (0.437) *** 
Observations 52613 
 
33542 
 
19071 
  Notes: Means with standard deviations reported in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from a 
means differences t-test between people who had an eye examination and people who did not.  
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Table 3: Free Eye policy impact on eye examinations  
 (1) (2) 
Scotland -0.014* -0.016*** 
 (-1.84) (-3.00) 
Policy 0.011** 2.17e-4 
 (2.10) (0.03) 
Scotland×Policy 0.008 0.009 
 (0.79) (0.87) 
Exempt group  0.031*** 
  (4.82) 
Eyecheckt-1  0.226*** 
  (42.95) 
Eyecheckt-2  0.255*** 
  (45.91) 
Female  0.036*** 
  (8.23) 
Age: 30-39  -0.006 
  (-0.97) 
Age:40-49  0.061*** 
  (8.51) 
Age:50-59  0.084*** 
  (10.54) 
Number of children  -0.004 
  (-1.50) 
Married  0.015** 
  (2.43) 
Separated  0.015* 
  (1.86) 
Widowed  -0.010 
  (-0.47) 
Good health  -0.013** 
  (-2.47) 
No visits to GP  -0.036*** 
  (-7.49) 
No qualification  -0.027*** 
  (-4.41) 
First or higher degree  0.024*** 
  (4.05) 
HH income: top 25%  0.014*** 
  (2.94) 
HH income: bottom 25%  -0.017*** 
  (-2.78) 
Year trends No Yes 
Constant 0.363*** 0.152*** 
 (88.79) (17.86) 
Observations 52613 44388 
R-square 0.0003 0.1873 
Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
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Table 4: Heterogeneous effect of policy (triple difference) 
 (1) (2) 
Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25% 0.054** 0.042* 
 (2.13) (1.82) 
Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25% -6.27e-5 7.61e-4 
 (-2.12e-3) (0.03) 
Year trends No Yes 
Other covariates No Yes 
Observations 52613 44388 
R-square 0.0031 0.1875 
Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other explanatory variables included are controls for eye test 
payment, exemption, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education and equivalised household income 
(position in distribution). 
 
Table 5: Placebo estimates (fake policy in September 2004) 
Scotland×Placebo policy -0.0124 
  
 
(-0.93) 
  Scotland×Placebo policy ×HH income: top 25% 
 
0.035 
 
  
(1.13) 
 Scotland×Placebo policy ×HH income: bottom 25% 
 
-0.014 
 
  
(-0.39) 
 Observations 32850 32850 
 Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other explanatory variables included are controls for eye test 
payment, exemption, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education, equivalised household income 
(position in distribution) and year trends. The sample is restricted in the period prior to the free eye care policy 
introduced in Scotland. 
 
Table 6: Placebo estimates (treatment group: London, inner and outer) 
Fake treatment×Policy -0.010 
  
 
(-0.52) 
  Fake treatment×Policy×HH income: top 25% 
 
-0.033 
 
  
(-0.72) 
 Fake treatment×Policy×HH income: bottom 25% 
 
-0.024 
 
  
(-0.36) 
 Observations 32795 32795 
 Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other explanatory variables included are controls for eye test 
payment, exemption, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education and equivalised household income 
(position in distribution) and year trends. The sample is restricted to individuals residing in England only.  
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Table 7: Placebo estimates (unrelated outcomes) 
Outcome: Blood test 
Scotland×Policy 0.011 
  
 
(1.04) 
  Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25% 
 
0.033 
 
  
(1.35) 
 Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25% 
 
0.027 
 
  
(0.87) 
 Outcome: Cholesterol test 
Scotland×Policy -0.007 
  
 
(-0.85) 
  Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25% 
 
0.014 
 
  
(0.77) 
 Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25% 
 
0.014 
 
  
(0.63) 
 Outcome: Chest or other x-ray health check-up 
Scotland×Policy 0.005 
  
 
(0.60) 
  Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25% 
 
0.009 
 
  
(-0.52) 
 Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25% 
 
-0.014 
 
  
(-0.63) 
 Observations 44388 44388 
 Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other explanatory variables included are controls for eye test 
payment, exemption, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education, equivalised household income 
(position in distribution) and year trends. 
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis 
 (1) (2) 
Excluding individuals who may be exempt from eye examination payment 
Scotland×Policy 0.007  
 (0.61)  
Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25%  0.041* 
  (1.69) 
Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25%  -0.011 
  (-0.35) 
Observations 37490 37490 
R-square 0.1763 0.1765 
Excluding individuals who were interviewed in 2006 (before the policy introduction) 
Scotland×Policy 0.008  
 (0.85)  
Scotland×Policy×HH income: top 25%  0.041* 
  (1.74) 
Scotland×Policy×HH income: bottom 25%  -1.41e-4 
  (-0.01) 
Observations 44262 44262 
R-square 0.1871 0.1872 
Notes: OLS estimates. Coefficients reported with t-statistic in parentheses. The level of statistical significance is 
denoted by: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Other explanatory variables included are controls for eye test 
payment, exemption, gender, age, number of children, marital status, education, equivalised household income 
(position in distribution) and year trends. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Decision to undertake health test and treatment in a sequential two-period 
framework 
 
 
  
Test 
No Test 
Good Health (1-p) 
Bad Health (p) 
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐) + 𝑝(𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠),𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)]) 
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) 
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) + 𝑝𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) 
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) 
Bad Health (p) 
Good Health (1-p) 
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Figure 2: Eye healthcare utilisation 
 
Notes: Average uptake of eye examinations based on authors’ calculations using the 
BHPS. The year variable refers to the corresponding BHPS wave. The vertical reference 
line at year 2006 denotes the period since the introduction of the eye care policy in 
Scotland. Observations corresponding to interviews conducted between April-December 
2006 are excluded since we cannot identify whether people in Scotland had an eye 
examination before or after the policy was introduced. The spike observed in 2006 is 
driven by the small sample size of that particular year, so the 2006 figure should be 
interpreted with caution.  
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Figure 3: Eye healthcare utilisation (by income groups) 
 
Notes: Average uptake of eye examinations based on authors’ calculations using the BHPS. 
The year variable refers to the corresponding BHPS wave. The vertical reference line at 
year 2006 denotes the period since the introduction of the eye care policy in Scotland. 
Observations corresponding to interviews conducted between April-December 2006 are 
excluded since we cannot identify whether people in Scotland had an eye examination 
before or after the policy was introduced. The spike observed in 2006 is driven by the small 
sample size of that particular year, so the 2006 figure should be interpreted with caution. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Deriving the effect of a change in the cost of examination (𝒄) on the testing threshold 
level (𝒑∗)  
 
From equation (6) we know,  
 
𝑝∗ =
𝑢[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑐)]
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑠)−𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
   
Then, 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑐
= −
𝑢
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) − 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐)]′ = −
𝑢
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) − 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
(−1) (
1
𝑌 − 𝑐
)
=
𝑢
𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) − 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
(
1
𝑌 − 𝑐
) 
 
By assumption, we know that 𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) − 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) > 0 and 𝑌 − 𝑐 > 0, therefore 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑐
> 0. 
 
 
A2: Deriving the effect of a change in the cost of treatment (𝒔) on the testing threshold 
level (𝒑∗)  
 
Equation (6) can be rewritten as,  
 
𝑝∗ =
[𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑐)]
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑠)−𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)
= [𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑐)]
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑠)−𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌
𝑣
𝑢)
=
𝑙𝑜𝑔( 𝑌𝑌−𝑐)
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢
)
   
Then, 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑠
= −
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌
𝑌 − 𝑐)
[𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢
)]
2 [𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢
)]
′
= −
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌
𝑌 − 𝑐)
[𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢
)]
2
(−1)
(
 
 1
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢 )
 
 
=
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌
𝑌 − 𝑐)
[𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢
)]
2
(
 
 1
𝑌 − 𝑠
𝑌
𝑣
𝑢 )
 
 
 
 
By assumption, we know that  𝑌 − 𝑠 > 0 and 𝑌 − 𝑐 > 0, therefore 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑠
> 0. 
 
A3: Deriving the effect of a change in income (𝒀) on the testing threshold level (𝒑∗)  
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For ease of presentation, let us denote  𝑧(𝑌) = 𝑢𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑠) − 𝑣𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌), and 𝑓(𝑌) =
𝑢(𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌) − 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌 − 𝑐)). From equation (6) then,  
 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑌
=
𝑧(𝑌)𝑓(𝑦)′ − 𝑓(𝑌)𝑧(𝑌)′
[𝑧(𝑌)]2
=
𝑧(𝑌)𝑢 (
1
𝑌 −
1
𝑌 − 𝑐) − 𝑓(𝑌) (𝑢
1
𝑌 − 𝑠 − 𝑣
1
𝑌)
[𝑧(𝑌)]2
 
 
By assumption, 𝑧(𝑌) > 0. Furthermore since 𝑌 − 𝑐 > 0, then 𝑓(𝑌) > 0 and 
1
𝑌
−
1
𝑌−𝑐
< 0. Also, 
since it is assumed that 𝑌 − 𝑠 > 0 and 𝑢 > 𝑣, then 𝑢
1
𝑌−𝑠
− 𝑣
1
𝑌
> 0. This means that 
𝜕𝑝∗
𝜕𝑌
< 0. 
